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Abstract  
We analyze how (anticipated) changes in the competitiveness of the seats of 
municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers. The 
competitiveness of the seats changes because the merger changes the 
composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next 
election. We use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the 
increase in the competitiveness of a councilor's seat, the more likely he is to vote 
for the merger. These effects are not related to the behavioral responses of the 
voters, but arise from the councilors’ desire to avoid electoral competition. 
Key words: Seat competitiveness, local politics, municipal mergers 
JEL classification numbers: H11, H77, C34, C35, C36, D72 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan yksilöaineistoa käyttäen, miten kunnan-
valtuutettujen huoli valtuustopaikkojensa kilpailullisuuden muutoksesta vaikuttaa 
heidän äänestyspäätöksiinsä kuntaliitosäänestyksissä. Valtuustopaikkojen 
kilpailullisuus muuttuu kuntaliitoksissa, koska liitos muuttaa seuraavien 
kuntavaalien poliittista kilpailua ja valtuustopaikkojen määrää. Hyödyntämällä 
tätä vaihtelua havaitsemme, että mitä vähemmän valtuutetun valtuustopaikan 
kilpailullisuus kiristyy, sitä todennäköisemmin valtuutettu äänestää 
kuntaliitoksen puolesta. Tulokset eivät selity äänestäjien käyttäytymisellä, vaan 
johtuvat siitä, että valtuutetut haluavat välttää kilpailua valtuustopaikoista.    
Asiasanat: Uudelleenvalinta, kunnallispolitiikka, kuntaliitokset 
JEL-luokittelu: H11, H77, C34, C35, C36, D72 
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1. Introduction 
Do politicians want to reset the boundaries of their constituencies, if given a 
chance to cast a vote in favor of such a change? If not, why? Do they fear the 
ensuing mechanical effects, which mirror how votes are transformed into seats 
for a given vote distribution? Or do they want to escape behavioral effects (i.e., 
“psychological effects”, as Duverger (1954) called them), which describes how 
voters react to a boundary change? 
To answer these questions  even tentatively  turns out to be surprisingly hard 
despite the large cumulative literature on the effects of redistricting on electoral 
outcomes (e.g., Gelman and King 1990). As the U.S. evidence shows, the answer 
seems to depend in a subtle fashion on by whom and how the district boundaries 
are redrawn (e.g., Gelman and King 1994, Carson and Crespin 2004) as well as 
on how easily the politicians can anticipate and prepare for the political 
consequences of redistricting (Boatright 2004). The tradeoffs are real and severe, 
as redistricting may for example lead to a loss of the incumbency advantage (i.e., 
personal vote, see Desposato and Petrocik 2003).  
The question of whether politicians want to redraw the boundaries of their 
constituencies is even harder to answer once we recognize that redistricting is 
often  especially outside the U.S.  intimately related to the integration or 
disintegration of local governments and to the associated resetting of local 
administrative boundaries, i.e., to fiscal federalism in its various forms (see Oates 
1999). Both redistricting and resetting of the boundaries of local governments are 
among the most sensitive and conflict-prone issues in local politics. They also 
have a number of other common denominators: First, as the received literature on 
redistricting suggests, they both may change electoral outcomes, for example by 
either reducing or increasing seat competitiveness.1 Second, they both affect the 
ability and willingness of the politicians to attend to the needs of their 
constituencies. For example, regional heterogeneity in voter preferences favours 
both smaller electoral districts and secession at the local level (see, e.g. Miceli 
1993, Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Redistricting and resetting of the local 
government boundaries may also fundamentally shape policy outcomes.2 
Further, political separation of regions is rarely desirable from an economic 
efficiency point of view (Bolton and Roland 1997). The two strongest arguments 
for this in the current context are the more efficient provision of local public 
                                              
1 See, e.g., Gelman and King (1994), Desposato and Petrocik (2003) and Carson and Crespin (2004). 
Coate and Knight (2007) consider socially optimal redistricting and the role of seat competitiveness 
therein.   
2 See, e.g., Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) and Besley and Preston (2007) on how redistricting 
influences policy outcomes. 
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goods (due to better coordination and economies of scale; see also Alesina and 
Spolaore 1997, Ellignsen 1998) and the observation that most of the benefits of 
local secession can be contractually or administratively replicated by a suitable 
degree of decentralization of authority within the non-separated regions. 
Taken together, the foregoing suggests that there is a myriad of interdependent 
mechanical and behavioral effects which determine whether incumbent 
politicians would want to redraw the boundaries of their constituencies. We aim 
at quantifying one of them, the behavioral response of incumbent politicians to 
(anticipated) political consequences of a change in the boundaries of their 
constituencies. Following the recent work by Blais, Lachat, Hino and Doray-
Demers (2011) and Fiva and Folke (2012) on the mechanical and behavioral 
effects of electoral reforms, we analyze, in particular, how certain well-defined 
mechanical changes in the competitiveness of the seats of municipal councilors 
affect their voting behavior using data from a recent wave of municipal mergers 
in Finland. 
A unique feature of this paper’s empirical context is that it is about local 
politicians deciding whether or not to vote for a municipal merger and the 
immediate re-election consequences of this decision. The voting decision is 
directly linked to the future competitiveness of the councilors’ seats because if 
the merger goes through, it changes not only the composition of voters but also 
the set of political competitors in the next election and the (relative) size of the 
municipal council. This set up allows us to study whether the councilors want to 
vote for the proposed resetting of the constituency boundaries in the light of the 
mechanical changes that such a change induces in the competitiveness of their 
seats. Moreover, as we show shortly, a decomposition of these mechanical 
changes makes it possible for us to study why the politicians react in the way they 
do.  
Our analysis differs from the prior work in two important ways: First, unlike the 
earlier empirical literature on the effects of redistricting on politician behavior in 
the U.S. (Glazer and Robbins 1985 and Levuax-Sharpe 2001, Boatright 2004), 
we examine directly how the expected change in seat competitiveness due to 
redistricting influences the politicians’ stance toward it. Second, our analysis 
differs from the prior work by Blais et al. (2011) and Fiva and Folke (2012), 
because these papers study the mechanical and behavioral effects of electoral 
reforms on ex post electoral outcomes, such as the vote obtained by parties, 
disproportionality, and the (effective) number of parties. Our analysis focuses 
instead on estimating the feedback effect of the mechanical change in seat 
competitiveness on the ex ante behavior of politicians. It is not known a priori 
how the councilors react, because the proposed merger can either increase or 
decrease the competitiveness of their seats. 
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Our key empirical finding is that a councilor is more likely to vote for a merger if 
the competitiveness of his seat does not increase in the merger state relative to 
the status quo of no merger. Moreover, we find that changes both in the 
composition of voters and political competitors as well as in the relative size of 
the municipal councils are important in explaining this behavioral response. This 
suggests that politicians pay a lot of attention to whom they compete with, and 
also to competition per se. 
Our results bear directly also on the literature on fiscal federalism and, in 
particular, on the literature on the optimal formation of local governments. It 
seems that if boundary setting is delegated to the local level, local politicians’ 
desire to avoid political competition may lead to sub-optimal mergers from the 
point of view of the society at large. This lesson ought to be of wider interest, 
because almost all nations have decentralized the provision of some basic public 
services to local governments and because their boundaries are, every now and 
then, in flux and reset.3 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: In the next section, we describe the 
institutional framework and our data. We present our econometric approach in 
Section 3, where we e.g. explain how we measure the behavioral response of 
incumbent politicians to the anticipated political consequences of a change in the 
boundaries of their municipals. We report our main results in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
  
                                              
3 How nations reset the boundaries of local governments appear to differ. For example, in Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Israel and Sweden mergers were implemented, or at least strictly overseen, by the 
central government, whereas in Finland, Germany and Japan recent merger decisions were made at the 
local level by local politicians. In the Netherlands, both types of mergers have occurred. 
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2. Institutional background and data 
Our analysis uses data from Finnish municipalities and concentrates on the 
behavior of municipal councilors who were elected in 2004 for a four year term 
and who voted for municipal mergers that eventually took (or, if turned down, 
did not take) place between 2007 and 2009.  
2.1 Local decision making and municipal mergers 
In Finland, public goods and services are provided by two tiers of government 
where municipalities constitute the local level. The Finnish public sector is 
highly decentralized and municipalities are responsible for providing more 
services than in most other countries, including social and health care services 
and primary education. Municipalities are therefore of considerable importance 
to the whole economy, with the GDP share of municipality spending being 
roughly 18%.  
The number of municipalities is high relative to population, with a large variation 
in municipal population size. During the past decade smaller municipalities have 
found it increasingly difficult to provide the large scale of services that they are 
responsible for. These difficulties are due to many things, such as population 
aging and internal migration from rural to urban areas. As a result of this, there 
has been a constant pressure to reduce the number of municipalities in recent 
years. 
Each municipality has a council which is responsible for all major strategic and 
financial decisions.4 Councils are elected every four years using open list 
elections, which apply the D’Hondt method. Parties select the candidates but 
voters determine their order within the lists.5 Each municipality has only one 
electoral district. Council size is a step function of the municipality’s population 
and is determined by law as follows: 13, 15 or 17 for municipal population 2000 
or less, 21 for 2,001–4,000; 27 for 4,001–8,000; 35 for 8,001–15,000; 43 for 
15,001–30,000; 51 for 30,001–60,000; 59 for 60,001–120,000; 67 for 120,001–
250,000; 75 for 250,001–400,000 and 85 for over 400,000. 
                                              
4 The council also chooses the municipal board, which has a preparatory role. The composition of the 
board is based on party shares in the council, i.e., each party in the council get seats in the municipal 
board according to their share of council seats.  
5 In the open list D’Hondt method, each voter casts a single vote to a single candidate. Parties gain seats 
based on the sum of votes that their candidates get. Within the parties, the seats are allocated by ranking 
the candidates based on their individual votes. There are eight parties in the Finnish parliament, which 
also dominate the municipal politics. Some local single-issue groups exist as well. The parliament and 
municipal councils are dominated by the three biggest parties with a combined overall share of votes of 
around 60 percent in both 2004 and 2008 elections. 
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Being a member of a municipal council is a part-time job, with meetings taking 
place monthly. There are limited direct pecuniary rewards from having a seat in 
the council.6 Of course, holding a council seat can also generate indirect rewards, 
such as prestige, better chances of getting elected in the national parliamentary 
elections and improved non-political labor market prospects. 
Mergers between municipalities are voluntary and the municipality councils are 
allowed to decide which potential mergers they consider. A typical merger 
process is as follows: After an initial feasibility study, the municipal boards make 
a proposal of the merger to the municipal councils. This proposal is voted on by 
the councils. In about half the cases, the potential merger includes more than two 
municipalities. If the proposed merger gains a majority in all the participating 
councils, the merger goes through. If not, it is cancelled and the municipalities 
continue as they were. In general, the merger votes are conducted simultaneously 
among the municipalities contemplating a merger.7 
2.2 Data sources 
We have collected data on how each individual councilor voted in the merger 
votes. These data were collected separately from each municipality and were 
often available online. We have linked these voting data to the data on municipal 
elections held in 2004 and 2008. These elections data were provided by the 
Ministry of Justice.8 We were able to match the data on voting and re-election for 
3,804 individual councilors coming from 135 municipalities and 59 (potential) 
municipal mergers. Out of the 135 municipalities in our data, 99 underwent 
eventually a merger.9 
Besides data on the election outcomes, such as the number of votes the 
councilors received in the 2004 elections and whether they ran and were re-
elected in 2008, we have data on the councilors’ age, sex, and whether they have 
served more than one term. In addition to this, we have augmented our data by 
variables describing different municipal characteristics, such as population and 
mean income, provided by the Statistics Finland. Moreover, we used geographic 
information system  techniques and Statistics Finland grid data to calculate the 
                                              
6 The reward consists mainly of meeting fees, which vary roughly from 50 Euros to more than 300 Euros 
per meeting. There are also separate fees for subcommittee meetings, such as the subcommittee of 
education or health care. Council and municipal board chairmen also get an annual fee on the top of the 
basic meeting fees. All the fees increase with municipality size. 
7 The timing is not entirely simultaneous, because the lengths of council meetings differ. Moreover, it 
seems that in some rare cases, the voting was sequential on purpose.  
8 The data are managed on behalf of the Ministry of Justice by a commercial operator (Tieto Oyj). 
9 In a few cases, the same municipality was involved in two separate merger votes during the time period. 
These were, however, separate merger processes. For example, the city of Rauma underwent one merger 
in 2007 and another in 2009. 
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mean distance of municipal population to the center of the municipalities that 
contemplate a merger.  
To give a flavor of our data, Table 1 reports the share of councilors who voted 
for a merger, conditional on the merger and re-election outcomes in 2008.10 It 
shows, for example, that out of the councilors who are from the municipalities 
that merged and who were re-elected in 2008, 91% voted for the merger. The 
share is a bit lower, 88%, among the councilors who are from the municipalities 
that merged and who were not re-elected. The difference between these two 
shares (+3 %-points) is much larger than the corresponding difference among the 
councilors who are from the municipalities that did not merge (-11 %-points).  
 
Table 1 Conditional voting behavior 
 
 
 
The differences in Table 1 are consistent with the view that the re-election 
prospects of councilors influenced their voting in the merger votes, but 
obviously, the reverse is also possible. This means that how the re-election 
prospects affected the merger vote cannot be inferred from the raw data. For that, 
a more principled econometric approach is needed. 
  
                                              
10 The 2008 elections were conducted using the new merged municipalities as constituencies even if the 
subsequent merger effectively took place at the start of 2009. The election dates are fixed and elections 
are held simultaneously in all municipalities. After a merger, there are no guarantees that the “old” 
municipalities get any representation in the new council. Further descriptive statistics can be found from 
Appendix A and B. 
Re-election = 1 Re-election = 0
Merger = 1 91.22 % 87.83 % 89.15 %
Merger = 0 54.12 % 65.73 % 60.63 %
79.77 % 81.95 %
Note: The numbers correspond to the share of councilors who voted 
for a merger in each cell.
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3. Econometric approach 
3.1 Mechanical and behavioral effects  
Building on the seminal insights of Duverger (1954), Blais et al. (2011) and Fiva 
and Folke (2012) have recently explored how the mechanical and behavioral 
effects of electoral reforms can be estimated. We follow their lead.  
In our context, the resetting of municipal boundaries gives rise to three main 
effects. We consider each of them in turn: 
First, for a given vote distribution, the resetting of municipal boundaries results 
in a mechanical effect, which mirrors how differentially the votes of the 
candidates of the merging municipalities are transformed into seats if their 
municipalities merge, as compared to them not merging.  
Second, the resetting of municipal boundaries may lead to a behavioral effect of 
voters who in the subsequent 2008 election decide how to react to the merger, as 
compared it not having taken place. The vote distribution of the 2004 election 
does not contain information on such voter reactions, whereas that of the 2008 
election does.  
Third, there is a potential behavioral effect by the councilors, which can appear 
in two varieties. On the one hand, there is an ex post behavioral effect by the 
councilors, as the resetting of municipal boundaries may change for example 
their willingness to rerun for a seat as well as their campaign efforts in the 2008 
election, as compared to the state of affairs when the boundaries remain intact. 
On the other hand, there is an ex ante behavioral effect, which mirrors the 
proactive behavioral response of the incumbent politicians to the anticipated 
political consequences of a change in the municipal boundaries.  
We focus on quantifying the ex ante behavioral effect of the councilors. We do 
so by studying how the mechanical effect changes the competitiveness of the 
seats of the municipal councilors and how this (anticipated) change in the seat 
competitiveness then feeds back to the councilors’ voting behavior when they 
vote for the proposed merger.  
A priori, it is not known how the anticipated change in the seat competitiveness 
feeds back to the councilors’ voting behavior in the merger vote. The reason for 
this is that if the merger goes through, it i) changes the composition of voters, ii) 
mixes the set of political competitors from the merging municipalities (which 
correspond to the electoral districts in the 2004 election) and iii) reduces the size 
of the municipal councils relatively to the size of the municipalities. As the prior 
literature on redistricting suggests (e.g., Gelman and King 1994, Desposato and 
Petrocik 2003, Carson and Crespin 2004), the first two of these can either 
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increase or decrease the competitiveness of a given councilor’s seat. However, 
the expected effect of the change in the council size is that it increases the 
competitiveness of seats. The reason for this is that council size is, by law, an 
increasing but concave function in the population of the municipalities.  
3.2 Measuring seat competitiveness  
As Folke (2011) has stressed, measuring closeness of elections  and thus seat 
competitiveness  is not straightforward in proportional election systems. Under 
the (open-list) D’Hondt method, where voters cast votes to individual candidates 
and where the seats are allocated to multiple parties based on the total vote count 
of the parties’ candidates, a candidate can be a close competitor to multiple 
candidates both from his/hers own party and from the other parties. This means 
that a small change in the number of votes to the candidate or to the other 
candidates can change the election outcome for a given candidate. There are 
therefore many potential counterfactual election outcomes for a given candidate. 
In particular, the election outcome for candidate i can change when candidate j 
wins votes from candidate k, even if i’s own vote share does not change.  
Our aim is to study how the voting behavior of councilors varies with the 
anticipated change in the competitiveness of their seats. We therefore need a 
measure that is capable of capturing such a change in the seat competitiveness in 
the Finnish proportional election system.  
To this end, we study a well-defined mechanical change in the seat 
competitiveness and resort to a bootstrap elections procedure to generate 
counterfactual election outcomes. We explain these two important ingredients of 
our empirical approach next. 
Mechanical change in seat competitiveness 
We define the mechanical change in seat competitiveness for councilor i as (p1i  
p0i), where p0i and p1i are proxies for the security of the seat of the councilor in 
the 2008 elections in the no-merger state (p0i) and the merger state (p1i), 
respectively. We calculate these proxies as if all the voters voted or abstained as 
they did in the 2004 (pre-merger) elections, but mimic uncertainty related to the 
election outcomes using the bootstrap procedure (explained below).  
As defined, the mechanical change in seat competitiveness is convenient for three 
reasons. First, it allows us to abstract from the behavioral effect of voters in the 
subsequent 2008 election. It is hard to capture such effects empirically, especially 
if resetting the municipal boundaries cuts some voters loose from their old 
representative in a heterogeneous way, as the work by Desposato and Petrocik 
(2003) suggests. Second, it also is harder for the incumbent politicians to predict 
how voters react in the subsequent 2008 election than to anticipate the likely 
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effects of the mechanical change. This is important, because we aim at 
quantifying the ex ante behavioral reaction of the councilors to an anticipated 
change in the seat competitiveness. Anecdotal evidence moreover suggests that 
the difference between p1i and p0i corresponds to the intuitive thinking of the 
incumbent Finnish councilors about how a merger affects their re-election 
prospects.11 Finally, focusing on the mechanical change in seat competitiveness 
is a means to study the ex ante reactions of the councilors. This means that we 
can abstract from the myriad ex post behavioral reactions by councilors (e.g., 
Boatright 2004), as they learn more about the new environment and prepare for 
the 2008 election. 
Bootstrap procedure 
We measure p0i and p1i by using a bootstrap elections procedure, which allows us 
to create a set of counterfactual re-election prospects.12 The procedure uses 
information on the identity of the candidates, the vote distribution from the 2004 
election and the number of available seats both in the 2004 and 2008 elections.  
The procedure consists of three steps: First, we sample votes with replacement 
for each candidate from the vote distribution of the 2004 municipal election. The 
sampling probability of a vote for a candidate is the share of the votes that he or 
she received in the 2004 election. Repeating this vote sampling many times 
produces a set of votes for each candidate. Second, we use the sampled votes to 
calculate a hypothetical election outcome using the actual election rules. Third, 
we repeat this bootstrap election many times (S = 10 000) and count the share of 
times a particular candidate is elected. This share is our measure of seat 
competitiveness.13  
We measure the competitiveness of the seat of a councilor in two ways. First, we 
use the 2004 municipalities as the constituencies in the bootstrap procedure, 
irrespectively of whether the merger actually took place or not. This gives us p0i. 
Second, we repeat the bootstrap procedure as if all the mergers took place. The 
hypothetical post-merger constituencies are constructed by allowing both the set 
of candidates and voters as well as the number of available council seats to 
mirror the properties of the post-merger entity. For example, the number of 
available council seats is determined by the legal limit, which is a function of the 
                                              
11 This is what a number of councilors have explicitly shared with us in confidential discussions and what 
can be inferred from public discussion, both in the media (e.g., 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/kuntapoliitikot_vastustavat_kuntaliitosta_-_perusteluna_lahidemokratia/5672050, in 
Finnish) and councilors’ own online blogs (e.g., http://www.eskorepo.net/, in Finnish). 
12 The use of simulated elections to generate counterfactual outcomes is widespread. We follow here 
Kotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö (2012), who use the procedure to identify close winners and losers in a 
proportional election system for an RDD analysis.  
13 Further details of the procedure are explained in Appendix C. 
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population of the merged entity. We do this for all considered mergers, 
irrespectively of whether they eventually took place or not. This gives us p1i.  
We obtain a measure for the mechanical change in seat competitiveness as (p1i  
p0i). This total mechanical change in seat competitiveness arises, as mentioned 
above, from three sources. First, the number of available council seats diminishes 
after a merger due to the council size rule. Second, the set of candidates change. 
Third, if the merger goes through, it changes the composition of voters, even for 
the given vote distribution from the 2004 election. This matters, because the 
number of seats that a party obtains is affected by how the votes are distributed 
over all the parties.14  
We can make use of these various sources of variation to further dissect the 
mechanical change into its sub-components. The first sub-component relates to 
the change in the set of candidates and voters. The second is due to the reduction 
in the relative number of seats.  
To identify the first of these two sub-components, we repeat the above bootstrap 
procedure as if all the mergers had taken place, but with the new council size 
being equal to the sum of the pre-merger council seats (instead of its actual legal 
size). This means that each councilor competes in these bootstrap simulations in 
the new, merged constituency with all the candidates from the merging 
municipalities, but with the twist that the overall number of available seats is not 
reduced as the law would require. We call this variable ݌෤ଵ௜ and define ሺ݌෤ଵ௜െ݌଴௜ሻ 
as the competition mechanism. This change in seat competitiveness arises, 
because the set of candidates that compete for the council seats changes for a 
given vote distribution from the 2004 elections.  
Subtracting the competition mechanism from the total mechanical change gives 
the change in seat competitiveness that is due to the change in the number of 
council seats. This gives us the second sub-component, which we call the council 
size mechanism. It is equal to      1 1 1 0 1 0i i i i i ip p p p p p      .  
Descriptive statistics of changes in seat competitiveness 
The histograms for the seat competitiveness variables are presented in the three 
panels of Figure 1. 
The histogram of p0i is displayed in Panel A. It shows that the probability 
distribution has a lot of mass on the right. This means that it is very likely that 
many of the existing councilors would be re-elected in the 2008 election, if it was 
                                              
14 That is, all the voters that reside in the merging municipalities other than a councilor’s (prior) home 
municipality are “new” from his perspective and matter for the electoral outcome, even if the vote 
distribution of the merging municipalities is held constant. 
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organized so that the contemplated merger did not take place and voters behaved 
like in the 2004 election. The reason for why the probability of re-election is less 
than one for some of the councilors is related to them being marginal (i.e., lucky) 
and subject to electoral competition. 
The histograms of ݌෤ଵ௜ and p1i are displayed in Panels B and C, respectively. They 
show, in turn, that holding other things constant (but for the merger outcomes), 
the contemplated mergers have a large mechanical effect on the election 
outcomes. The mass on the left of these histograms means that it is likely that a 
number of the existing councilors would not be re-elected in the 2008 election if 
it was organized so that the contemplated merger took place and voters behaved 
like in the 2004 election. These potential drop-outs are typically councilors from 
the smaller municipalities that are contemplating a merger with a larger 
municipality. 
Figure1 Histograms of ݌଴௜ (Panel A), ݌෤ଵ௜ (Panel B) and p1i (Panel C) 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, we display the sub-components of the total mechanical effect. First, 
as the panel titled B-A shows, the competition mechanism decreases the seat 
competitiveness of some candidates, but hurts others’. Second, the council size 
mechanism is shown in the panel titled C–B. This mechanism hurts most of the 
candidates, but, as expected, benefits no one. Third, the total mechanical change 
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is displayed in the panel titled C–A. It shows that the merger increases the 
competitiveness of seats of most of the candidates, but actually benefits some 
rare candidates. Those who appear to benefit were typically marginal in the 2004 
election in a municipality that then subsequently contemplated a merger with a 
much smaller municipality.  
Overall, there is a lot of variation in our bootstrapped measures for seat 
competitiveness and in the total mechanical change over the candidates. The 
measures seem to work as expected (e.g., the council size mechanism is negative 
for everybody) and mirror what they were constructed for.  
Figure 2 Histograms of competition and council size mechanisms and their 
sum	 
 
 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the seat competitiveness measures 
unconditionally and conditional on the councilors’ voting behavior and merger 
outcomes. The upper part of the table shows that the competition and council size 
mechanisms as well as the total mechanical change are on average more negative 
in the group of councilors who voted against the merger than they are in the 
group of councilors who voted for the merger. This means that the councilors 
who voted in favor of the mergers experience a smaller increase in the 
competitiveness of their seats. This is mostly due to a difference in p1i (and ݌෤ଵ௜) 
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between the two groups. The lower part of the table shows that there are similar 
differences if the numbers are conditioned on the merger eventually taking or not 
taking place.  
Table 2 also shows that the mean of p0i does not vary a lot between those 
councilors who voted for the merger and who did not vote for it, or between 
those who come from the merging municipalities and who come from the 
municipalities that did not eventually merge. Since this measure of seat 
competitiveness is based on the pre-merger 2004 vote distribution, it can be seen 
as a measure of the level of political competition in the municipalities at the time 
the mergers were contemplated. This suggests that a large part of the cross-
sectional variation in the mechanical change in seat competitiveness is driven by 
the variation induced by the mergers, and not by variation in the seat 
competitiveness in the pre-merger municipalities.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the seat competitiveness measures 
 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of councilors
p 0 0.841 0.195 0.854 0.188 0.838 0.196
0.664 0.333 0.576 0.325 0.684 0.332
p 1 0.433 0.367 0.309 0.324 0.462 0.370
Competition mechanism -0.177 0.333 -0.278 0.306 -0.153 0.334
Council size mechanism -0.231 0.184 -0.267 0.180 -0.223 0.184
Total mechanical change -0.408 0.352 -0.544 0.308 -0.376 0.354
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of councilors 2,727
p 0 0.852 0.192 0.836 0.196
0.611 0.350 0.685 0.324
p 1 0.353 0.353 0.464 0.368
Competition mechanism -0.241 0.348 -0.152 0.323
Council size mechanism -0.258 0.188 -0.221 0.182
Total mechanical change -0.499 0.346 -0.372 0.348
1,077
Merger = 0 Merger = 1
All
3,804
Vote = 0 Vote = 1
720 3,084
1p
1p
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3.3 Econometric specification and estimation 
Our empirical analyses use variants of the following econometric model 
 
(1)  1 0 ,ikm ikm k m i i ikmv p p u       x β  
 
where vikm equals one if councilor i representing party k from municipality m 
votes in favor of the merger (and is zero otherwise); xikm is a vector of control 
variables; k is a party fixed effect; m is either a merger fixed effect or a 
municipality fixed effect depending on the model specification15; and (p1i  p0i) is 
our measure for the total mechanical effect of the merger on seat 
competitiveness. In alternative specifications, we decompose the effect of the 
total mechanical effect into the effects of the competitive and council size 
mechanisms by replacing (p1i  p0i) with ሺ݌෤ଵ௜െ݌଴௜ሻ and ሺ݌ଵ௜ െ ݌෤ଵ௜ሻ. 
We are interested in the parameter , which captures the effect of the mechanical 
change in seat competitiveness on councilors’ voting behavior. We estimate it 
using variation in (p1i  p0i), which comes from the exogenous council size rule 
and from how the 2004 votes are distributed over the other candidates.  
We control for the merger and, alternatively, municipal fixed effects for a 
number of reasons. On the one hand, the expected gains from the mergers may 
differ in various dimensions, such as the perceived economies of scale in the 
provision of local public goods, in the new entity’s ability to cater to the 
heterogeneous preferences of voters and in its ability to internalize externalities 
in the provision of local public goods. Moreover, voting for a merger is a policy 
choice. It is therefore likely that it is at least partly driven by the municipals’ past 
policy choices, which in turn may be correlated with the municipal-level 
averages of (p1i  p0i). On the other hand, the merger or municipal level fixed 
effects account for the fear that a merger will result in closing down of local 
services (e.g. elementary schools) in the smaller municipalities. It is important to 
control for this fear, because it may be correlated with changes in seat 
competitiveness. It is, if the councilors of the smaller municipalities are more 
likely to lose their political power as a result of the merger.16 
                                              
15 The merger fixed effects refer to the constituencies that would result from the municipal mergers if they 
go through. 
16 See e.g. Knight (2008) on the link between regional representation in a legislative body and the 
geographic distribution of centralized spending.  
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The inclusion of the merger or municipal level fixed effects can also be 
motivated by a concern of sample selection.17 To see why, it is useful to recall 
that sample selection due to unobservables can be formulated as an omitted 
variable problem (Heckman 1979). This problem can be corrected for by 
introducing the inverse Mills’ ratio as an additional explanatory variable. Since 
the decision to vote for a merger is decided at the municipal level, selection into 
our sample on the basis of unobserved municipal level characteristics can be 
controlled for by using the municipality fixed effects. 
We include a number of explanatory variables in our vector of control variables, 
xikm. These explanatory variables are added to (1) in groups that refer to 
individual controls (i.e., councilors’ characteristics), the vote shares of the 
councilors, as well as to party, municipality and merger-level explanatory 
variables. 
The group of individual (councilor-level) controls includes gender, age, age 
squared, party affiliation and an incumbency dummy.18 We control directly for 
the vote shares of each councilor at both the municipal and merger level in the 
regressions in order to focus on the variation in the distribution of votes over the 
other candidates. These vote shares of the councilors refer to the individual 
councilor’s vote share in the old municipality and to the corresponding 
(hypothetical) share in the contemplated merger, as calculated using the 2004 
vote data. These variables allow us to control, for example, for within-
municipality variation in the perceived councilor-level costs and benefits of the 
mergers to the extent that they are correlated with the vote shares.  
In order to capture the role of parties, we control for the mergers’ mechanical 
effects on the parties’ electoral success in the merging municipalities. We include 
these controls, because the change in the parties’ success may be correlated with 
the anticipated change in the councilors’ seat competitiveness. If they are, it 
could lead to an endogeneity problem. To account for this, we use two measures 
that mimic the councilor level change in seat competitiveness. First, we control 
for the change in the expected seat share of the party of a councilor, where the 
party’s share refers (narrowly) to his/her party’s share, as calculated using the 
boundaries of the 2004 constituencies. Second, we control for the same expected 
change in the seat share, but with the twist that the party’s share refers to his/her 
                                              
17 If sample selection is related to observable explanatory variables, it does not induce a bias in the 
standard OLS estimation. It could be, for example, that the municipalities that decided to vote for a 
merger are those where the adverse changes in seat competitiveness are smaller than in the municipalities 
that did not decide to have a vote. This kind of selection is not a source of concern to us.  
18 We also include a dummy for the rare cases where a vice-councilor voted in the merger-vote because 
the actual councilor was absent. See Appendix A for a further discussion.  
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party’s share, as calculated for the constituencies that would follow if all the 
mergers took place.19  
Finally, the groups of municipality and merger-level explanatory variables 
include population, per capita mean income, median population distance from the 
municipal center, unemployment, dependency ratio, per capita taxes, per capita 
grants and per capita expenditures, as measured in each municipality and at the 
merger level, respectively. The merger-level controls include, in addition, 
separate indicators for each of the different merger sizes in terms of the number 
of participating municipalities and an indicator for whether the merger partners 
were all involved in a municipal cooperation with each other at the time of the 
merger vote. It should be obvious that these groups of control variables can only 
be included in those versions of (1) that do not have the corresponding fixed 
effects.  
  
                                              
19 These two measures are constructed using the results of the bootstrap procedure as follows: First, we 
sum the values of p1i in each municipal-party cell, as defined by the old constituencies and then similarly 
in the merger-party cells, as defined by the new constituencies, assuming all mergers took place. We then 
subtract from these sums the status quo party share level, i.e. the party share in the actual 2004 elections 
in the pre-merger municipality, as measured by the sum of the values of poi in each municipal-party cell. 
These differences are proxies for the mergers’ mechanical effects on the parties’ electoral success.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Main results  
We start from Table 3, which presents the results from the various versions of 
model (1) without any fixed effects (Panel A) and with the merger fixed effects 
(Panel B). The standard errors are clustered spatially, using the constituencies 
that would result from the mergers (if they go through) as the clustering unit. In 
the first column of Panel A of Table 3, the regression has no controls. As we 
move to the right across the columns, the models have progressively more 
controls.   
The estimated effect of the mechanical change in seat competitiveness on 
councilors’ voting behavior, ߜመ, is statistically significant and positive in all 
columns of Panel A of Table 3. As Panel B shows, the effect is robust to adding 
the merger fixed effects. The effect is also economically large, as the point 
estimates vary from 0.145 to 0.220. 
Table 3 Total effect results (no and merger fixed effects) 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p 1–p 0 0.208*** 0.200*** 0.220*** 0.190*** 0.120** 0.173***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.051) (0.060) (0.052) (0.059)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.22
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
p 1–p 0 0.160*** 0.155*** 0.181*** 0.214*** 0.145*** ..
(0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.055) (0.050) ..
R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.34 ..
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vote shares No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Municipality controls No No No No Yes Yes
Merger controls No No No No No Yes
Notes: The results are from linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether the
councilor voted in favor of the merger. Sample size in each regression is 3804. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the merger level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A: No fixed effects
Panel B:  Merger fixed effects
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Table 4 repeats the regression analyses of Table 3 with municipality fixed 
effects. While still systematically positive, the point estimates are smaller and 
statistically significant only in the first two columns. This decrease in the 
estimated effect is not surprising, because adding the municipality fixed effects 
means that the effect of the mechanical change in seat competitiveness is 
identified from within-municipality variation only. This means, in particular, that 
the council size mechanism is largely closed down, because council size is a 
municipal-level variable.20 These results should therefore be interpreted as the 
lower bounds of ߜመ. 
Table 4 Total effect results (municipality fixed effects) 
 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results from models in which (p1i  p0i) is replaced by 
ሺ݌ଵ௜ െ ݌෤ଵ௜ሻ and ሺ݌෤ଵ௜െ݌଴௜ሻ. The former isolates the effect of the council size 
mechanism on the councilors’ voting behavior and the latter captures the 
competition mechanism.  
In Table 5, we present the results from various models that mirror those of Table 
3. Its Panel A shows that the effects of the council size and competition 
mechanisms are positive and statistically significant. The former is also larger 
than the latter. These findings are robust across the columns and, as Panel B 
shows, to the inclusion of the merger fixed effects. These findings suggest that 
changes in the composition of voters and political competitors and in the relative 
size of the municipal councils are both important in explaining the councilors’ 
voting behavior. It thus seems that politicians pay a lot of attention to whom they 
compete with, and to competition per se. 
                                              
20 The council size mechanism is not completely absent, because it may have a heterogeneous effect on 
the seat competitiveness of the candidates within a municipality. If there is a limited amount of such 
heterogeneity, then the council size mechanism does not contribute to the identification in these 
regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p 1–p 0 0.069** 0.067* 0.058 0.050
(0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039)
R2 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Vote shares No No Yes Yes
Party controls No No No Yes
Notes: The results are from linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether the
councilor voted in favor of the merger. Sample size in each regression is 3804. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the merger level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5  Decomposition results (no and merger fixed effects) 
 
 
 
In Table 6, we present the results from models that mirror those of Table 4. It 
shows that when the municipal fixed effects are added, the effect of the 
competition mechanism is positive and statistically significant. However, the 
effect of the council size mechanism is small and insignificant. This is expected, 
because the council size mechanism varies mostly across the municipalities. 
These findings are robust across the various specifications.  
At this point, it is useful to ask, is the reduction in the estimated effects of the 
council size and competition mechanisms mostly due to the fixed effects 
removing relevant variation in the data? Or is it due to them reducing 
endogeneity bias? These are hard questions to address conclusively. However, if 
we just inadvertently reduce (exogenous) variation by including the municipal 
fixed effects, then the estimates of Table 6 can be regarded as lower bound 
estimates. This is good to keep in mind when interpreting the quantitative 
significance of these results. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Council size mechanism 0.258*** 0.289*** 0.316*** 0.265*** 0.214** 0.217***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.091) (0.072)
Competition mechanism 0.197*** 0.177*** 0.206*** 0.179*** 0.104* 0.159** 
(0.059) (0.057) (0.054) (0.063) (0.053) (0.064)
R2 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.22
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Council size mechanism 0.239*** 0.246*** 0.258*** 0.274*** 0.204*** ..
(0.067) (0.066) (0.078) (0.078) (0.059) ..
Competition mechanism 0.149*** 0.142*** 0.175*** 0.205*** 0.127** ..
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.058) (0.055) ..
R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.34 ..
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vote shares No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Municipality controls No No No No Yes Yes
Merger controls No No No No No Yes
Panel A: No fixed effects
Panel B:  Merger fixed effects
Notes: The results are from linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether the
councilor voted in favor of the merger. Sample size in each regression is 3804. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the merger level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Decomposition results (municipality fixed effects) 
 
 
 
4.2 Robustness tests  
In this section, we report a series of sensitivity tests that we have implemented to 
probe the robustness of our results. The results of these sensitivity tests are 
reported in Table 7. 
We start by repeating the analyses of Table 4 and 6 using the subsample of data 
that includes only the councilors from the three traditionally dominant (largest) 
parties. These estimates are reported in Panel A and B of Table 7. The results are 
stronger in terms of the size of the effects and their statistical significance.21 
There are several potential explanations for this apparently stronger ex ante 
behavioral effect. For example, the larger party organizations may be better able 
to inform their councilors on the potential adverse effects of the mergers on the 
seat competitiveness. Moreover, the politicians for whom political careers matter 
more may self-select into larger parties.  
An alternative way to decompose the total mechanical change into its sub-
components (i.e., the council size and competition mechanisms) is to use an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. For this, we assume that (p1i  p0i) is the 
variable to be instrumented and use either the council size or the competition 
mechanism as the instrument. We report in Panel C of Table 7 estimations that 
include municipal fixed effects and use the competition effect as the instrument. 
As the panel shows, the IV approach gives results that are similar to those 
                                              
21 The same is true also for the no fixed effects and the merger fixed effects models both in the total effect 
and decomposition regressions in all specifications. We do not report these for the sake of brevity. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council size mechanism 0.026 0.031 0.003 0.005
(0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.037)
Competition mechanism 0.101** 0.093** 0.092* 0.078*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046)
R2 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Vote shares No No Yes Yes
Party controls No No No Yes
Notes: The results are from linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether the
councilor voted in favor of the merger. Sample size in each regression is 3804. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the merger level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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reported in Table 6. The main difference is that the estimated coefficients are 
slightly larger. This is, in fact, natural, because Table 6 can technically be seen as 
the reduced form of this IV. We get similar results if we use the IV estimation 
without the fixed effects or with merger fixed effects.22 
Table 7 Results for robustness tests 
 
 
 
4.3 Policy significance  
How do the estimated effects translate into changes in the likelihood of mergers? 
This question cannot be answered solely on the basis of the point estimates, 
                                              
22 The IV results become stronger if the large party subsample is used.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p 1–p 0 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.102** 0.102** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041)
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
N 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Council size mechanism 0.065* 0.077** 0.042 0.054
(0.035) (0.036) (0.043) (0.042)
Competition mechanism 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.131***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049)
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
N 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108
(9) (10) (11) (12)
p 1–p 0 0.144*** 0.128** 0.135** 0.116** 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
1st stage F -test 316 346 539 513
N 3,804 3,804 3,804 3,804
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Vote shares No No Yes Yes
Party controls No No No Yes
Notes: The results are from linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether the
councilor voted in favor of the merger. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the merger level
and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signifigance at 1, 5 and 10
percent level, respectively. 
Panel A: Total effect for large parties
Panel B: Decomposition for large parties
Panel C: Decomposition using IV
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because for a merger to go through, it needs a majority in each municipal council 
contemplating the merger. To assess the policy significance of the estimates calls 
therefore for an evaluation of how much the likelihood of the mergers increases 
if the effect of mergers on seat competitiveness is neutralized. 
To do this evaluation, we use the estimated models as follows: First, we simulate 
merger outcomes by setting the mechanical effect to zero. We then compare the 
rate of occurrence of mergers thus obtained to the simulated rate of occurrence 
when the effect is set at its (non-zero) estimated value.23  
We report the results of the simulations in Table 8. The reported numbers are the 
rate of occurrence of mergers in the simulations for three different sets of 
municipalities. First, the set of municipalities that underwent the merger; second, 
the set of contemplated mergers that did not take place; and third, all the 
municipalities that voted for a merger. The table reports results for three different 
counterfactuals: one where both the competition and council size mechanisms are 
set to zero (columns 1–2) and one where either of them is set to zero, but the 
other is allowed to work (columns 3–4, and 5–6). The effect of the change in seat 
competitiveness is the difference between the actual and counterfactual rates of 
occurrence. 
Table 8 illustrates two things. First, it shows that the estimated models predict a 
much higher rate of occurrence of mergers in those municipalities that actually 
merge, as compared to those who do not merge. Second, the table shows that the 
rate of occurrence of mergers increases by 8 percentage points (0.783–0.704) 
when we turn off the total mechanical change in seat competitiveness in the 
model that includes the merger fixed effects. Since there are 59 contemplated 
mergers in our data, these translate in total into about 5 (0.079*59) mergers that 
did not take place due to desire by the councilors to avoid more competitive 
seats. The increase is lower, about 2 percentage points (0.662–0.640), when the 
municipality fixed effects model is used. These effects are in relative terms larger 
in the group of municipalities that did not merge.24 
                                              
23 The results we report in this section are based on the following simulation: First, we draw a random 
shock for a councilor from a uniform distribution (on the unit interval) and compare it to the fitted value 
generated by either the estimated model or the counterfactual model (with the effects set to zero). If the 
draw is smaller (larger) than the fitted value of the given councilor, he is assumed to vote for (against) the 
merger in the simulation. When we draw such a shock for all councilors, we can calculate whether a 
certain merger gains the required majority in all the participating municipalities or not. Second, we repeat 
this 1,000 times and take note of each merger occurrence. The merger fixed effects results are based on 
column 11 of Table 5 and the municipal fixed effects are based on column 4 of Table 6.  
24 It is worth pointing out two things about these simulations: First, the predictive accuracy of the 
estimated linear probability model that includes the municipal fixed effects model is better than that of the 
model with the merger fixed effects. However, , the estimated models do not need to automatically 
predict mergers accurately even if they predict councilors’ votes accurately. The reason for this is that one 
opposing municipality can prevent a widely supported merger from taking place. Second, it could be 
argued that a Probit/Logit model would be better suited than a linear probability model for this type of 
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Table 8 Simulation results. 
 
 
 
The simulation results reported in Table 8 apply to the group of municipalities 
that voted for a merger. This is a selected group of municipalities. It is therefore 
of interest to consider the possibility that the anticipated increase in seat 
competitiveness prevented some municipalities from voting on a merger, and 
thus reduced the likelihood of such mergers taking place.  
To shed some light on this issue, we draw a stratified random sample from the 
universe of all potential mergers. To limit the set potential mergers to a feasible 
size, we do not allow them to cross county borders, they have to share a common 
border and they cannot include more than six partners.25 The sample is stratified 
based on the number of merger partners so that the drawn sample matches our 
data in this dimension. Since we have election data for all municipalities, we can 
calculate the total mechanical effect of the mergers on seat competitiveness also 
for this stratified random sample.  
We find that (p1i  p0i) is on average -0.458 in the stratified random sample of 
potential mergers. This total mechanical effect is larger (in absolute terms) than 
in the sample that voted on the mergers (-0.408, see Table 2). This is consistent 
                                                                                                                                    
simulation exercise. We use the linear probability model, because it is not as sensitive to a perfect-
predictor problem from which Probit/Logit models suffer and because the simulated voting decisions are 
robust to changes in the predictions near the ends of the probability unit interval [0, 1]. Moreover, we 
have experimented with Probit/Logit models and found that our main qualitative results do not change.  
25 See Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2012) for the details of this sampling procedure. 
Effect:
Model 
specification:
Merger fixed 
effect
Municipality 
fixed effect
Merger fixed 
effect
Municipality 
fixed effect
Merger fixed 
effect
Municipality 
fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Merger = 1:
   Actual 0.949 0.914 0.949 0.914 0.949 0.914
   Counterfactual 0.980 0.939 0.970 0.915 0.965 0.938
Merger = 0:
   Actual 0.178 0.049 0.178 0.049 0.178 0.049
   Counterfactual 0.358 0.064 0.304 0.050 0.231 0.063
All:
   Actual 0.704 0.640 0.704 0.640 0.704 0.640
   Counterfactual 0.783 0.662 0.759 0.641 0.732 0.661
Notes: The table presents results from a merger vote simulation excercise. The numbers correspond to 
shares of realized mergers for each model specification and merger sub-sample. The simulations are
based on 1,000 repetitions.
Total effect Council size mechanism Competition mechanism
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with the view that the anticipated increase in the seat competitiveness may have 
prevented some municipalities from formally voting on a merger.  
We can also repeat the merger simulations of Table 8 for the stratified random 
sample of potential mergers. To this end, we generate out-of-sample predictions 
using our estimated regression models. A limitation of this procedure is, 
however, that we don’t have estimates for the merger or municipal fixed effects 
for the municipalities that are included in the stratified random sample. 
Therefore, we follow a pragmatic approach and conduct the merger simulation 
using model (6) in Table 3. To account for the lack of fixed effects, i.e. to allow 
the voted mergers to be unobservably different from those potential mergers that 
were never actually voted upon, we calibrate the estimated models by introducing 
an unobserved shock to each potential merger. The idea of these shocks is to 
reduce the likelihood of the merger going through in the simulated merger votes 
so that the vote outcomes would better reflect the lower empirical rate of 
occurrence among the potential mergers that were never voted upon. We repeat 
the simulations over a range of such shocks. We find that the anticipated 
increases in the seat competitiveness reduce the rate of merger occurrence by [-
0.13, -0.02] percentage points, as the calibrated shock varies between [0, -0.5]. 
These numbers suggest that the anticipated increase in seat competitiveness has 
prevented some mergers from taking place also in the stratified random sample of 
potential mergers. The effect appears to be non-negligible for a number of 
potential merger constellations, except for those that are the most unlikely to 
succeed (i.e., when the calibrated shock is very negative). 
In sum, anticipated increases in seat competitiveness make municipal mergers 
less likely in two ways. First, conditional on a potential merger being voted, it 
reduces the likelihood of the merger going through by 2-8 percentage points. 
Second, the anticipated increase in seat competitiveness has also prevented some 
mergers from taking place also among the potential mergers that were never 
voted upon. These foregone mergers are the price that the society at large pays 
because the councilors care about the private gains that holding a public office 
generate and because they want to avoid electoral competition. 
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5. Conclusions 
It is unclear whether politicians want to reset the boundaries of their 
constituencies, if given a chance to do so. Our analysis studies this question by 
estimating the feedback effect of an anticipated (mechanical) change in seat 
competitiveness on the ex ante behavior of politicians in a merger vote that 
determines whether the boundaries of their constituencies change or not.  
Our key finding is that a councilor is more likely to vote for a merger if the 
competitiveness of his/her seat does not increase in the merger state relative to 
the status quo of no merger. Moreover, we find that changes in the composition 
of voters and political competitors and in the relative size of the municipal 
councils are both important in explaining this behavioral response. This suggests 
that politicians pay attention to who they compete with, and also to competition 
per se.  
Our findings imply that incumbent politicians vote for policies that allow them to 
escape political competition. Because councilors react proactively to expected 
changes in political competition, the design of the boundaries of the Finnish local 
governments appears to be subject to strategic gerrymandering-type 
considerations (Gul and Pesendorfer 2010). This makes endogenous merging of 
(local) jurisdictions inefficient for a reason that the prior literature has not so far 
explicitly considered (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Gordon and Knight 
2009 and Weese 2011). 
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Appendix A: Structure of data 
Table A1 illustrates the structure of our data with respect to actual re-election in 
2008. It shows whether councilors got re-elected conditional on their vote and the 
merger taking place. Panel A displays the unconditional percentages whereas in 
panel B, each row is conditioned on the row above. The last row of panel A 
shows that most of our observations are in the cell corresponding to the outcome 
in which a councilor voted for the merger that took place but the councilor was 
not re-elected. In contrast, there are very few observations in the cell 
corresponding to the outcome in which a councilor voted against the merger that 
took place and the councilor was re-elected. The last row of Panel B shows that 
merger outcome is correlated with re-election probabilities, with mergers being 
associated with smaller re-elections probabilities. 
Table A1 Data structure 
 
 
 
We analyze the voting behavior of individual councilors who voted for municipal 
mergers that eventually took (or, if turned down, did not take) place between 
2007 and 2009. This calls for two clarifications: 
First, in rare cases a vice-councilor voted in the merger-vote because the actual 
councilor was absent. We assume for the purposes of this paper in these cases 
that the vice-councilor is a perfect and obedient substitute for the councilor. We 
Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected
5.44 % 5.70 % 5.34 % 2.44 % 10.44 % 6.73 % 38.51 % 25.39 %
Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected Not re-elected Re-elected
48.82 % 51.18 % 68.58 % 31.42 % 60.80 % 39.20 % 60.26 % 39.74 %
Note: Panel A reports data frequencies and Panel B reports frequencies conditional on the previous row.
Total: 3804 councilors
Voted against Voted for
18.93 % 81.07 %
58.89 % 41.11 % 21.17 % 78.83 %
18.93 % 81.07 %
No merger Merger No merger Merger
Panel A
Panel B
Total: 3804 councilors
Voted against Voted for
No merger Merger No merger Merger
11.15 % 7.78 % 17.17 % 63.91 %
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therefore use the vote of the vice councilor on the L.H.S. but the characteristics 
of the absent councilor on the R.H.S. 
Second, it could be that councilors’ parties have all the agenda setting power, and 
thus, that the individual councilors simply vote according to the party line. 
However, from our data it is clear that this is not case. Out of the 3,804 
councilors in our data, 2,109 councilors come from municipalities where there is 
no variation in vote within the councilors’ home municipality. If these were the 
only data, it would be hard to analyze empirically the determinants of the voting 
decisions using councilor-level data. However, of the remaining 1,695 
councilors, for which the voting varies within their home municipalities, there is 
councilor-level variation within the parties in the voting behavior (in 1,057 
cases).  
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Appendix B: Control variables 
Table B1 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables.  
Table B1 Descriptive statistic 
 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of councilors
Councilor characteristics:
   Age 48.3 11.0 48.0 11.2 48.4 10.9
   Female 0.365 0.482 0.358 0.480 0.368 0.482
   Two or more terms in council 0.600 0.490 0.617 0.486 0.594 0.491
   Share of votes in municipality 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.016 0.023 0.016
   Share of votes in merger 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.007
   Municipality party success -0.226 0.230 -0.284 0.239 -0.203 0.222
   Party success -0.047 0.118 -0.050 0.117 -0.046 0.118
Municipal characteristics:
   Population 9,656 15,241 7,896 10,333 10,686 17,450
   Taxable income (€ per capita) 10,511 1,761 9,691 1,476 10,991 1,742
   Mean population distance to centre (km) 5.49 10.32 7.26 16.71 4.45 1.99
   Unemployment rate (%) 10.9 3.87 12.5 3.74 9.9 3.65
   Dependency ratio 1.51 0.27 1.64 0.26 1.44 0.25
   Municipal income tax rate (%) 19.0 0.68 19.2 0.6 18.8 0.72
   Central government grants  (€ per capita) 1,563 574 1,827 529 1,408 544
   Total expenditures  (€ per capita) 5,000 737 5,266 825 4,845 635
Merger characteristics:
   Population 28,323 27,271 27,014 21,815 28,930 29,693
   Taxable income (€ per capita) 11,171 1,583 10,328 1,288 11,562 1,567
   Mean population distance to centre (km) 8.91 4.71 12.68 6.16 7.16 2.39
   Unemployment rate (%) 11.2 3.72 12.8 3.47 10.4 3.63
   Dependency ratio 1.52 0.23 1.64 0.19 1.47 0.23
   Municipal income tax percent (%) 19.0 0.51 19.2 0.4 18.9 0.54
   Central government grants  (€ per capita) 1,431 501 1,688 440 1,312 487
   Total expenditures  (€ per capita) 5,043 583 5,326 722 4,913 460
   Cooperation 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
   Merger size 2.9 1.5 3.4 1.6 2.7 1.5
All Merger = 0 Merger = 1
3,804 1,077 2,727
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Appendix C: Details on the bootstrap procedure 
This Appendix provides some additional details and motivation on the bootstrap 
procedure used to generate the measures for the seat competitiveness. As we 
explain in the main text, our procedure follows that of Kotakorpi, Poutvaara and 
Terviö (2012). In our application this means that the procedure uses information 
on the identity of the candidates, the vote distribution from the 2004 election and 
the number of available seats both in the 2004 and 2008 elections. 
The aim of the bootstrap procedure is to construct a smooth (continuous) 
measure for seat competitiveness in the 2008 elections that is capable of 
mirroring the complexities of a multi-party proportional election system and that 
varies between the candidates (who were all elected in 2004). In the Finnish 
open-list local election system, each voter gives a single vote to a single 
candidate. This implies that unlike in closed-list elections, a vote distribution 
over individual candidates is available in the Finnish system. It is therefore 
sensible to measure seat competitiveness at the level of candidates as opposed to 
the level of parties.  
The purpose of the re-sampling procedure is to mimic uncertainty naturally 
present in the election outcomes of individual candidates: Some councilors could 
lose their seat due to only a marginal change in the vote distribution, whereas for 
others, the change would have to be much larger.  
In principle, we could calculate p0i, p1i and ݌෤ଵ௜ without re-sampling using the 
2004 vote distribution. In this case, p0i would be equal to one for all the elected 
councilors in our data. Moreover, p1i and ݌෤ଵ௜ would be either zero or one. These 
measures would be coarse proxies of the election uncertainty, and thus incapable 
of mirroring seat competitiveness for many candidates.  
To mimic election uncertainty and to obtain less coarse measures, we sample 
votes with replacement for each candidate from the vote distribution of the 2004 
municipal election. The sampling probability of a vote for a candidate is the share 
of the votes that he or she received in the 2004 election. An underlying 
assumption of this sampling procedure is that the distribution of voters at the 
margin of abstaining and participating is identical. Repeating this vote sampling 
many times produces a set of votes for each candidate. The sampled votes are 
then used to calculate a hypothetical election outcome using the actual election 
rules. This determines whether a candidate is elected or not and completes one 
round of bootstrap election. This bootstrap election is then repeated many times 
(S = 10 000). The share of times a particular candidate is elected over these 
repetitions gives us then a measure for seat competitiveness.  
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To obtain p0i, we use the 2004 municipalities as the constituencies in the 
bootstrap procedure, irrespectively of whether the merger actually took place or 
not. To obtain p1i, we repeat the bootstrap procedure as if all the mergers took 
place. For this, the hypothetical post-merger constituencies are constructed by 
allowing both the set of candidates and voters as well as the number of available 
council seats to mirror the properties of the post-merger entity.  
An important detail of the re-sampling procedure is the size of each draw (i.e., 
the number of votes sampled per draw). For small municipalities the size of each 
draw is one vote. However, due to the law of large numbers, re-sampling will not 
introduce variation in the election outcomes over the repetitions if the draw size 
is small relative to the total number of votes given in the election. In other words, 
the larger the municipality is, the less likely it is to find candidates for whom the 
election outcome varies over the repetitions. This would lead to discrete and 
coarse measures of seat competitiveness. To avoid this, we follow Kotakorpi, 
Poutvaara and Terviö (2012) and sample votes in blocks. This re-introduces 
variation in the case of larger municipalities. For each municipality in which 
more than 1000 votes are given, we take only 1000 draws. We weight each vote 
in order to match the total number of votes in each bootstrap election round with 
the actual election. For example, in a municipality where 3500 votes were given, 
3.5 votes are allocated to the same candidate in each draw. This approach can be 
motivated, for example, with the group voting theory (e.g. Coate and Conlin 
2004). The number 1000 is ad hoc, but the distributions of the seat 
competitiveness measures are fairly stable over a reasonable range of the size of 
draws. 
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